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This is the first paper that examines economies of scale in stock exchanges. The
data employed in the study include cost and output statistics for 37 stock
exchanges in four continents around the world for the year 1997. I estimate two
traditional cost functions and find that ray (overall) scale economies exist only in
the very large stock exchanges but that there are significant scale economies with
respect to one of the outputs, ie the processing of trades. On the other hand, there
are not equally clear scale advantages related to activities involving company-
specific information. There are thus opposing forces, some tending to increase
standardization and scale and others favouring the continuization of more
localized facilities. The outcome of increasing competition may not be the
amalgamation of exchanges but instead the centralization of certain functions, eg
the trading function, and continued realization of others on a decentralized basis.
There is nonetheless an obvious incentive for closer and deeper cooperation
between European stock exchanges.
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Onko arvopaperipörssitoiminnassa skaalaetuja?




Tutkimus analysoi onko arvopaperipörssien toiminnassa skaalatuottoja. Analyysin
kohteena on 37 eri puolilla maailmaa sijaitsevan pörssin kustanuksia ja toimintaa
koskevat tiedot vuodelta 1997. Skaalaetujen olemassa oloa analysoidaan empiiri-
sesti testaamalla perinteisiä kustannusfunktioita. Ainoastaan suurten pörssien toi-
minnassa löydettiin selkeät koko operatiiviseen toimintaan liittyvät skaalaedut.
Pörssikauppojen prosessointiin liittyvien järjestelmien osalta skaalaedut kuitenkin
ovat selkeät sekä pienissä että suurissa pörsseissä. Yrityskohtaisen tiedon käsitte-
lyyn liittyvissä toiminnoissa sen sijaan ei havaittu yhtä selkeästi vastaavia tehok-
kuushyötyjä. Pörsseissä näyttääkin olevan sekä toimintoja, jotka kannattaisi yhdis-
tää pörssien välillä että toimintoja, jotka soveltuvat parhaiten kansallisesti hoidet-
tavaksi. Pörssitoiminnan kehitys saattaa tutkimustulosten perusteella johtaa laajoi-
hin, useiden pörssien yhteisiin kaupankäyntijärjestelmiin. Alueelliset pörssit voi-
vat kuitenkin perustellusti säilyä, koska niillä on parhaat edellytykset hoitaa kon-
takteja oman alueensa yrityksiin. Pörssien kaupankäyntijärjestelmiin liittyvän sel-
keän skaalaedun vuoksi Euroopan pörssitoiminnassa on odotettavissa merkittäviä
rakennemuutoksia lähivuosina.
Asiasanat: arvopaperipörssit, yhteenliittymät, skaalaedut, tekniikka
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A stock exchange is an example of a type of firm that has been a local monopoly
in most countries. However, location will no longer prevent stock exchanges from
competing with each other, as intermediaries and investors seek efficient cross-
border services. Barriers between European securities markets have been largely
removed or overcome with the implementation of the OECD codes on free
movement of capital by the end of 1980s and the Investment Services Directive
by the mid-1990s. The technology is already sufficiently advanced and cheap to
enable investors to trade via networks. This is evidenced on a global scale in the
currency and bond markets. The recent success of EUREX is a good European
example of how networks are able to replace a trading floor in another country.
Within this context, the introduction of the euro can only speed up the
development toward a single European market for financial services. This
development also implies that location will gradually lose some of its importance
for market places and that competition between financial centres, market places
and securities firms will intensify.
Financial institutions have already reacted to the diminishing regulatory
barriers in Europe and the US and to the development of advanced
telecommunication technology. There have been many mergers in Europe and the
US between banks that are attempting to increase the scale of their operations.
There have also been some mergers between banks and insurance companies,
which suggests that these institutions see diversification of the scope of their
business as advantageous. This raisesthe question of whether a similar
development will take place in respect of stock market places.
Economic analysis suggests that a single market in securities will come into
being if there are no regulatory barriers that prevent the formation of a single
market and advanced telecommunication technologies exist, ie if the market is not
dependent on physical location. This may imply a single stock exchange for
securities trading if there are significant economies of scale involved in the
functions of stock exchanges. By contrast, the handling of complex information
may require face-to-face contacts and hence motivate the existence of multiple
market places for securities. This paper aims to contribute to the discussion on the
future of stock exchanges by providing an empirical analysis on economies of
scale in 37 stock exchanges around the world.
It is somewhat confusing thatthe empirical results in the academic literature
are so mixed as regards the existence of economies of scale and scope and the
effects of telecommunication technology, this being a very challenging area of
policymaking . Banks’ performance, for example, has been a focus of substantial
theoretical and empirical research for a long time (see eg Berger and Humphrey
1997 and Berger and Mester 1997). These studies find that inefficiencies exist in
banking, but there is no consensus on the sources of the differences in measured
efficiency. Economies of scale are not generally found in banking studies.
There are also some studies that have focused on scale economies in
information processing and the future of financial centres. Davis (1990) discusses
the future of financial centres in the light of optimal location theory of the firm
and oligopoly theory. He concludes that the harmonization of regulation in the EU
countries and the development of technology should lower entry barriers and
tighten competition between local financial centres and hence lead to decline in8
natural monopolies. Thus economies of scale in financial services may lead to the
emergence of a single global centre in Europe, with smaller centres in each
country.
Gaspar and Glaeser (1996) model cities as a means of reducing the fixed cost
involved in face-to-face interactions. They argue that straightforward information
can easily be transferred through electronic networks. However, with complex
information, instructions may easily be misunderstood, so that face-to-face
communication is required. Their empirical work shows that telecommunications
may in fact be a complement, or at least not a strong supplement for financial
centres. Their analysis does directly contradict a commonly made argument that
telecommunications will eliminate the significance of location.
1
Gehrig (1998b) models competition between market places. According to his
two-dimensional spatial model, there are strong forces for agglomeration, but
multiple markets will exist under free entry of firms when markets are large
enough. Another interesting outcome of the model is that deregulation of
transaction taxes is an equilibrium reaction to a significant decline in
transportation costs.
Gehrig (1998a) provides us with a recent survey of the literature on the
geography of financial activity. He argues that geographical dispersion of
financial activity exists because financial markets are not frictionless, in contrast
to the usual assumption in finance literature. He divides factors underlying the
development of financial centres into centripetal and centrifugal groups, as was
suggested already by Kindleberger (1974). Economies of scale are the major
centripetal force, according to Kindleberger and Gehrig. They argue that such
economies are found in payment and settlement systems as well as in currency
trading systems.
2 Other centripetal forces, according to Gehrig (1998a), are
informational spillovers, market liquidity and thick market externalities, such as a
liquid labour market. The centrifugal forces arise from market access costs and
localization of information. Market access costs include transportation costs, as in
Gehrig (1998b), and transaction costs that do not depend on distance. The latter
were analysed in Pagano (1989).
Gehrig (1998a) argues further that centrifugal forces should be particularly
relevant in the markets for instruments that are priced on the bases of complex
local information, ie stocks and derivatives. Trading in these kinds of instruments
is also likely to be concentrated in local financial centres instead of global
financial centres or electronic trading systems.
Malkamäki and Topi (1999) survey the literature on the euro and its effects on
short-term money, securities and derivatives markets. They also discuss
consequences of the changes in the market structures for financial institutions, ie
stock and derivatives exchanges and securities settlement systems. Interestingly,
they find that liquidity in respect of bond derivatives has already shifted from
national derivatives exchanges to the Eurex, which is the centre of trading in
German bund derivatives. This development is consistent with Gehrig (1998a), as
parallel concentration has not taken place in the trading of stock derivatives.
                                                
1 For a discussion of this issue, see Gaspar and Glaesser (1996), Gehrig (1998a) and O’Brien
(1992).
2 Bauer and Hancock (1995) actually found that there are significant scale economies in providing
payment services in the Federal Reserve automated clearing house.9
The success of Eurex relative to LIFFE may, on the other hand, be partly
explained by differences in the governance of these two exchanges. Hart and
Moore (1996) argue that in cooperative exchanges members may be reluctant to
accept changes that would affect their own business, even if this is not in their
own interest in the longer run. According to this argument, LIFFE paid a high
price for developing its electronic trading system as late as it did.
It was found in this study that a stock exchange performs two functions,
which produce two kinds of output. Stock exchanges have computers, software,
and personnel for matching and processing trades. The trading function involves
the execution of limit and market orders, which comprise highly standardized
information. The empirical analysis showed that this function entails economies
of scale and could therefore be based on technology that is standardized
throughout each country or even throughout Europe as a whole, as has in fact
happened in the US. However, centralization of technology raises the question of
the sharing of income between exchanges – an issue that needs to be resolved to
facilitate the formation of alliances.
The second function performed by a stock exchange involves the personnel
and regulation needed to maintain the marketplace and to communicate with
companies in order to handle the listing of companies and to monitor how
company-specific information is released. Because this information is complex,
its handling may well require face-to-face contacts. Significantly, the results of
this study indicate that this function entails little or no returns to scale. Thus it
might be optimal that listing procedures and communication with companies and
other related matters continue to be handled at the national-exchange level in
Europe.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
operations and performance of stock exchanges around the world. Section 3
describes the cost functions to be estimated. The next section describes the data
and provides some comparisons between the stock exchanges. Empirical results
on cost functions are presented in section 5 and finally the key findings and policy
recommendations are presented in section 6.
2 Operations and performance of the stock
exchanges
In most European and Asian countries, stock exchanges have historically been
local monopolies. This is in sharp contrast with the North American exchanges,
which compete with each other throughout the US and Canada. Due to this
competition, the number of exchanges has declined over the years in the US. The
latest mergers of AMEX and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange with NASDAQ
were announced last year.
With the emergence of the euro, competition between the European stock
exchanges will intensify. Globalization of industrial and financial companies
increases the need for intercontinental gross-listings, which will increase
competition between stock exchanges across continents. It is therefore instructive
to compare the activities and relative performance of the European stock
exchanges in 1996. From table 1, one can see that European exchanges handled
about 50 % less transactions and other output than the North American exchanges,10
generated almost as much cost as the North American exchanges and generated as
much profit as the stock exchanges in the rest of the world. It is also important to
note that average cost per transaction at the end of 1996 was about three times
higher in Europe that in the North America, FIBV (1997).
Table 1. ([FKDQJHVWDWLVWLFVE\UHJLRQLQ
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Source: FIBV 1997, Annual Report
This could mean that European stock exchanges have taken advantage of their
monopolistic position in the pricing of services. Hence one might well conjecture
that this monopolistic market position might have led to cost inefficiencies. In that
case, quick measures would be needed to cut costs and improve the quality of
services in order to create more liquidity for share trading, if the European stock
market is to remain globally competitive. It is clear that international securities
houses will want to keep their own costs down and their efficiency up. They will
not want to pay membership fees to many European stock exchanges and to have
dozens of different terminals for trading and settlement of trades. Instead, they are
looking forward to having liquid European instruments and an efficient trading
infrastructure. If these are not available in Europe, the securities houses will be
able to trade in the shares of the biggest European listed companies on the NYSE
and NASDAQ. This is the case because customer demand for cross-border
transactions has already increased, as portfolios become increasingly diversified
on a global scale. The value of cross-border transactions will increase manifold
with the advent of the euro.
European stock exchanges are however rearranging their operations in order
to be more competitive. They are attempting to gain scale advantages by forming
bilateral or multilateral alliances among themselves. Such alliances exist already
between 1) nine exchanges in Germany, 2) four exchanges in Spain, three
exchanges in the Benelux countries, 4) three exchanges in the Scandinavian
countries, and 5) the Vienna Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse. Furthermore,
the London Stock Exchange and the Helsinki Exchanges have separately signed a
letter of intent to form an alliance with Deutsche Börse. At the same time, many
European stock exchanges have diversified their business into derivatives and
securities settlementas a way of achieving economics of scope.
However, there has not been much concrete progress so far, even though we
have seen many announcements of alliances or letters of intent to establish
alliances. At the same time, we know that the number of stock exchanges has been
declining continuously in the US since the 1930s. Furthermore, in the US, stock
exchanges generally merge instead of forming an alliance, in order to be able to
compete with the NYSE. These observations, together with the example of rapid11
expansion of Eurex relative to LIFFE, may indicate that cost efficiency as well as
the importance of efficient microstructure of trading systems has been
underestimated in Europe. It is therefore crucial for the listed companies and the
investment community that European alliances not turn out to be manoeuvres
aimed at protecting current institutions rather than purposeful expansions aimed at
cutting costs and increasing competitiveness.
It is however likely that cooperation among European stock exchanges will
continue to be based on alliances. This may also be rational because of the fact
that Europe is more heterogeneous with respect to language, culture and
bankruptcy legislation, for example. It seems highly useful to analyse the situation
to determine which operations of local stock exchanges are subject to returns to
scale and are thus more likely to be included in the cooperative activities of
European stock exchanges.
A close look at the operations and annual reports of the stock exchanges
indicates clearly that stock exchanges perform two functions and produce two
outputs. Stock exchanges have computers, software and personnel for matching
and processing trades. They also have the personnel and regulations needed to
maintain the marketplace and to communicate with companies in order to handle
the listing of companies and to monitor how company-specific information is
released and whether companies observe the regulations set by the marketplace.
The economic literature suggests that activities that are based on very simple
information are likely to be centralized. My hypothesis is that limit orders and
market orders can be considered standardized information, and the processing of
this information is technical and not issuer-specific, ie all the transactions are
treated in more or less the same way in the trading system. Thus execution of
trades could be based on technology that is standardized throughout each country
or even throughout Europe.
The literature also suggests that complex information, by contrast, may
require face-to-face contacts for proper understanding. Centralization in this area
may cause congestion problems and may also introduce a ‘transportation cost’
that is very high. It might therefore be optimal that listing procedures and
communication with companies and other related matters be handled by the
national exchanges also in the future. All this amounts to the empirical question of
the existence of scale economies in stock exchange operations. Scale economies
of the two functions, trade processing and firm-specific contacts, will be subject to
an empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.
3 The model
6SHFLILFDWLRQ
As a starting point for the analysis, I estimate the commonly used translog cost
function (see eg Berndt 1991). The translog function has the nice feature that it
allows scale economies to vary with the level of output. The translog cost function
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where
C is total cost,
Yi is the volume of output I,
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1 j 2 12 1 11 1
1
C
1 P ln Y ln Y ln 2
Y ln
C ln






2 j 1 12 2 22 2
2
C
2 P ln Y ln Y ln 2
Y ln
C ln




Economies of scale S at the point Y1, Y2 of the output set are defined by the
inverse of the elasticity of Ray average cost with respect to both outputs:




1 + = (4)
It is often useful to consider the scale economies along a particular expansion
path, eg defined by Y1 = f(Y2) (see eg Baumol etal 1988). Later in this study, we
will estimate a loglinear expansion path for stock exchanges.
If it turns out that the higher order terms as well as the cross-terms in the
translog model are zero, the translog function is reduced to the special linear case,
ie the linear logarithmic Cobb-Douglas cost function. The linear logarithmic
model to be estimated is in that case
i
i
i 2 2 1 1 P ln ) r / ( Y ln ) r / ( Y ln ) r / ( k ln C ln å b + a + × a + = (5)
with a1 + a2 = 1 and S = r.
As r is a constant, returns to scale cannot vary with the level of output in this
model.
0HDVXUHPHQWLVVXHV
In the literature reviewed in the first section, the processing of fairly
homogeneous transactions and evaluation of issuer-specific complex information
were seen as two separate functions. It was argued in section 2 that stock13
exchanges do in fact have two different operative functions, ie trade processing
and firm-specific contacts. Thus stock exchanges seem to have two outputs.
It is important to find proxies for the outputs in order to test empirically
whether there are economies of scale with respect to them and whether the cross-
term parameter are statistically significant. Knowing this may turn out to be
highly relevant as the stock exchange environment is changing rapidly, at least in
Europe and the US. Proxies for the output of the trading system are fairly obvious
since data are available on number and value of executed transactions. The output
relating to the listing procedure of companies and monitoring of company-specific
information is more difficult to measure. Possible proxies for this output might be

































Source: FIBV 1997, Annual Report
There are no direct measures available for inputs of stock exchanges. The two
most important input prices for the operations of stock exchanges (see table 2), are
trading system and labour costs. The relative share of system costs seems to be
almost identical across continents, except for South America. Thus it is not likely
that one could find enough dispersion in the data to get statistically significant
results in the empirical analysis, even if data on prices of such inputs were
available, which they are not. Individual stock exchanges are not generally able to
report their costs by activity (see also FIBV 1997), which makes it difficult to get
detailed statistics on their cost structures. However, one reason for homogeneous
system costs may be that the exchanges use fairly similar computer hardware and
software, which is similarly priced internationally. Labour costs fluctuate more
across continents. Unfortunately, data on cross-country labour costs for stock
exchanges are not available in Annual reports (see Annual reports 1997). In order
to include at least one price input variable in the analysis, I will use GDP per
capita as a proxy for differencies in labour costs across countries.
Some of the stock exchanges have expanded their operations to include
derivatives and settlement business. Many of the stock exchanges do not publish
sectoral cost figures. This is why the model to be estimated is a version of the
translog model that always includes a dummy variable for those exchanges whose
business activities include derivatives and securities settlement, in addition to two
outputs and one input parameter.14
4 Description of the data
I could not find a single empirical study testing for economies of scale in stock
exchange operations. This is probably because of the lack of data on costs of
individual exchanges and the limited number of institutions, even in global terms.
The data for this study were acquired by ordering annual reports from 45 stock
exchanges, of which 37 replied after four rounds (see Annual Reports 1997).
3
Although the information content of the reports varies, we were able to get the
necessary information on operating costs and depreciation. The exchanges also
vary institutionally. Sixteen of them also engage in derivatives business and seven
are involved in settlement of stock trades. Costs of these operations are included
in the data and a dummy is used to capture this information. The sample of 37
stock exchanges shown in annex gives global coverage for the data since it
includes exchanges from four continents and the Pacific area and from all the
major exchanges.
Data on output of exchanges were found in the International Federation of
Stock Exchanges (FIBV) Annual Yearbook (1997). As stated in sections 2 and 3,
the stock exchanges may have two outputs, one being the operation of trading
systems so as to match and execute transactions. To capture this output, I use total
number of transactions in stocks and mutual funds as well as the value of these
transactions. Stock exchanges also handle the listing procedure for companies and
work continuously with firm-specific information by eg releasing news and
monitoring whether companies follow the regulations set for the marketplace.
4 I
approximate this output by using data on number and market value of listed
companies.
The annex shows output statistics of the stock exchanges that are analysed in
this study. NYSE was by far the world’s biggest market place as measured by
value of listed equities. On the other hand, NASDAQ has twice as many listed
companies as the NYSE and LSE. Value of share trading is highest on the NYSE,
with the NASDAQ clearly in second place. Somewhat surprisingly, the largest
number of transactions was executed in Taiwan in 1997.
An interesting, but not really empirical, look at efficiency differences between
a set of fairly efficient stock exchanges is provided by table 3. The table shows
that both small and big exchanges can in principle be efficient because eg the
NYSE, LSE, the Irish Stock Exchange and the Taiwan Stock Exchange all have
very good performance figures. One should bear in mind that costs of stock
exchanges marked in the annex with * include also costs of derivative operations
and those marked ** include costs of securities settlement activities. Direct
efficiency comparisons can be made only between stock exchanges with the same
institutional structure. In the empirical analysis a dummy variable accounts for
derivatives and settlement system-related costs in the cross-section of costs. The
highest costs were generated in the NASDAQ (the Tokyo Stock Exchange had
                                                
3 Fiscal year is not the same as the calendar year in every country. Therefore the cost data for some
exchanges is from 6/1997-6/1998.
4 Small exchanges tend to do this more than the bigger ones. This may imply that regulators in
large countries regulate and monitor more by themselves than do regulators in smaller countries.15
higher costs, but the figure is not comparable because it includes costs from the
derivatives exchange).
Another useful look at the data is provided by figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
indicates that there are fairly pronounced returns to scale in the value of trading. 
On the other hand, figure 2 suggests that either there are no economies of
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Taiwan 0.9 0.11 0.47 374.4
NTRADE is number of trades
VTRADE is value of trades
VCOM is value of companies





















































It is first necessary to choose which proxies of the two outputs to include in
estimation of the translog costs function. The choice is based solely on statistical
considerations. I regressed the costs (C) separately on the number (NTRADE) and
value (VTRADE) of transactions and the number (NCOM) and total value
(VCOM) of listed companies, with a dummy (D).
5 The model was in logarithmic
form. Table 4 shows that a regression with NCOM and  VTRADE has a higher
coefficient of determination than any other combination of the explanatory
variables. Thus I use value of transactions and number of companies as output
variables in the translog model. One could argue that number of companies is also
logically a better estimate for the amount of work within the exchanges when
listing of companies and company-specific information is concerned. The choice
between number and value of transactions is more difficult to argue on a priori
grounds, but fortunately the empirical results in terms of explanatory power are
clear.
                                                
5 The dummy variable is included because of those exchanges engaging in business activities
involving derivatives and securities settlement. If costs of these operations are included in the total
costs used in this study, the dummy takes the value 1.17
Table 4. &RVWVUHJUHVVHGRQRXWSXWSUR[LHVORJV
1234
Intercept -0.802 -2.27 -1.105 2.305









D 0.245 0.522 0.457 0.090
(1.20) (1.93) (1.78) (0.36)
R
2 0.905 0.825 0.845 0.867
c
2(2) 1.225 0.477 0.826 0.372
N
a 34 35 32 33
All estimates are OLS estimates; the jackknife heteroscedasticity-consistent t-ratios (see
MacKinnon and White 1985) are inside parentheses under corresponding coefficient
estimates. The normality c
2 test for residuals is not rejected at reasonable significance
levels.
a All the regressions
 were run also for a sample of 32 stock exchanges. The resulting R
2s
were 0.905, 0.816, 0.845 and 0.868.
The translog model usually includes a few input price variables. Direct price
information on the inputs was not available since stock exchanges do not publish
information on them.
6 I use GNP per capita (GNBC) as a proxy for overall
country cost levels in order to include at least one price variable in the analysis.
The translog model given by equation (1) is thus to be estimated as
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The outcome of the estimation of equation (6) is presented in table 5 in the first
column (model 1). None of the related price variables  are statistically significant
at reasonable significance levels. Therefore I tested whether these terms can be
dropped. The F-test value in the second column of table 6 indicates that estimated
coefficients for BKTC-related variables are insignificantly different from zero.
The translog model now is reduced to a six-parameter model, which is convenient,
considering the number of observations. The estimation results of model 2 are in
the second column. It is interesting to note that the cross  term is not statistically
significant, implying that the two outputs of stock exchanges do not have
synergies. The F-test was next performed as above for the exclusion of second
order terms and the cross term (VTRADE*NCOM) in model 2, but the hypothesis
                                                
6 This finding is stated also in FIBV (1997).18
that these terms equal zero was rejected. However, the simple linear model (3)
also performs very well according to the model specification statistics.
Table 5. (VWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVIURPWKHWUDQVORJDQG
OLQHDUORJDULWKPLFPRGHOV
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 4.224 7.769 -0.802 -0.813

















































2 0.940 0.938 0.905 0.963
c
2(2) 0.590 1.619 1.225 0.951




Estimates for Models 1-3 are OLS estimates; the jackknife heteroscedasticity-consistent
t-ratios (see MacKinnon and White 1985) are inside parentheses under the coefficient
estimates. The normality c
2 test for residuals does not imply rejection at reasonable
significance levels. Estimates for model 4 are WLS estimates; the t-ratios are White
heteroscedasticity-consistent
a F-test for parameter restrictions on estimated coefficients of all the GNPC variables = 0
in model 1.
b F-test for parameter restrictions on estimated coefficients of both of the higher order
variables and the cross-term = 0 in model 2.
Finally, the linear model is re-estimated by weighted least squares using the
market capitalization (VCOM) as a weighting variable (model 4). The coefficients
do not change much but the coefficient of determination is as high as 96.3 %, ie
this very simple linear model is able to explain almost all the variation in the costs
of exchanges around the world. It is also clear that the results are not dominated
by the large number of small stock exchanges in the estimations.19
The estimation results of the translog model without price terms are in column
two. The scale elasticity at the sample median is obtained by differentiating the
estimated model with respect to the output variables VTRADE and NCOM and
calculating the elasticity by applying the estimated coefficients from table 6. The
corresponding median
7 scale elasticity coefficients are 0.38 with respect to the
value of trading, ie implying that the costs will increase by 38 % if the value of
transactions is doubled, and 0.76 with respect to the number of companies (see
table 6). This implies that there are significant scale economies involved in
trading operations. On the other hand, the costs will rise by 76 % if the number of
companies is doubled, ie scale economies exist also in the processing of firm-
specific information but to a lesser extent. This is reasonable since the listing
procedure and communication with the listed companies require either manual
work or personal contacts. However, doubling both outputs does not pay off
because the implied increase in costs is 114 %, which is fairly close to constant
costs.
Comparison of the estimation results with the outcome of the linear model is
also very interesting. The average elasticity coefficient for value of transactions is
almost the same (0.35) as in the translog model. The corresponding coefficient for
the number of companies (0.77) is almost identical with that of the translog
model. The dummy variable is not statistically significant in either of the
regressions. Nevertheless, its size is very stable (0.24-0.30) in all four
estimations. This indicates that costs will increase by about 30 % if an exchange
initiates derivatives exchange and securities settlement operations. This figure is
somewhat lower than one might expect from looking at annual reports of
derivatives exchanges and central settlement entities. On the other hand, many
stock exchanges that own a derivatives exchange have only a very limited set of
derivative products. Furthermore, settlement is usually provided only for stock
trades, which may explain the unexpectedly low coefficient.
In order to gain a better understanding of the cost elasticities, table 6 provides
some additional analysis on four points of the two outputs of stock exchanges
(see equation 4). This was done by ray average cost (Ray) analysis (see eg
Baumol etal 1988), starting as usual by estimating a loglinear expansion path for
the stock exchanges, lnVTRADE = f(lnNCOM). I constructed four groups
according to exchange size, the number of listed companies beeing used as a
proxy for size. The median number of companies was selected next for each group
as its representative output. Value of trading at this point was forecast by using
the outcome of expansion path estimation (see table 6, footnote 2). The scale
elasticity with respect to each output is reported in the table as is the Ray average
cost (S). The inverse of S is the scale elasticity of the combination of the two
outputs.
                                                
7 I use number of the listed companies as a ranking variable. The sample is skewed, as there are
few very big stock exchanges with a large number of companies listed (see table 3). Therefore, the













Q1 143 14 521 1.285 0.186 1.471 0.680
Q2 283 40 833 0.950 0.308 1.258 0.795
Q3 608 130 612 0.573 0.446 1.019 0.981
Q4 1865 717 369 0.021 0.648 0.669 1.495
Median 416 73 493 0.760 0.378 1.138 0.879
Loglinear
model
0.765 0.353 1.118 0.894
1 Median number of companies in each quarter.
2 Expected value of trading in the median exchange, in billions of US dollars according to
the estimated expansion path for stock exchanges, lnVTRADE = 8.95 + 1.52 lnNCOM.
3 Scale elasticity coefficient of costs with respect to number of companies (equation 2).
4 Scale elasticity coefficient of costs with respect to value of trading (equation 3).
5 Ray scale elasticity coefficient with respect to both outputs, COM and VTRADE
(equation 4).
6 Inverse of  c
RAY e .
The outcome of the analysis is somewhat surprising. It is very clear that there are
considerable returns to scale for an increase in the value of trading in the first
group, ie in the smallest stock exchanges. On the other hand, costs increase by
129 % if the number of listed companies is doubled. This analysis also clearly
suggests that mergers or very intense alliances of small exchanges do not save
costs. The situation is exactly the opposite for the biggest stock exchanges.
Doubling of both outputs increases costs by only by some 67 %. The analysis
actually shows that scale economies in stock exchanges are an increasing function
of size. Thus it is very cost efficient for the biggest exchanges to expand further.
Smaller exchanges should seek primarily to increaseing their trading volumes.
The analysis also raises the question of the pricing of services. Due to their
nonoptimal size, it seems to be the case that small exchanges have been able to
price their services so as to cover their high costs, thanks to their monopolistic
market position. The market power of stock exchanges is of course diminishing
rapidly.
The results raise some further concerns about the accuracy of the specification
of the estimated model. The quadratic form of the model may not necessarily be
able to very accurately describe the performance of stock exchanges broken down
into in widely differing size classes. Therefore one should draw only tentative
conclusions from the analysis.21
Table 7. 5HODWLYHHIILFLHQF\RILQGLYLGXDOVWRFNH[KDQJHV
￿
Model 2 Model 3
Philippine -0.816 Estonia -0.909
New Zealand -0.770 Philippine -0.777
Hong Kong -0.607 New Zealand -0.707
Montreal -0.546 Toronto -0.645
Toronto -0.489 Irish -0.609
NYSE -0.456 Vancouver -0.590
Madrid -0.304 Montreal -0.513
Switzerland -0.274 Germany -0.485
Irish -0.258 Nasdaq -0.396
Vancouver -0.213 Hong Kong -0.375
Germany -0.174 Madrid -0.228
Stockholm -0.173 London -0.183
London -0.144 Australian -0.166
Kuala Lumbur -0.133 Stockholm -0.157
Ljubljana -0.021 Kuala Lumbur -0.111
Australian 0.003 Helsinki -0.083
Paris 0.035 NYSE -0.066
Estonia 0.040 Oslo 0.013
Jakarta 0.061 Switzerland 0.017
Oslo 0.073 Copenhagen 0.061
Copenhagen 0.076 Jakarta 0.100
Nasdaq 0.107 Paris 0.136
Brussels 0.120 Athens 0.140
Athens 0.142 Osaka 0.144
Sao Paulo 0.215 Brussels 0.159
Helsinki 0.225 Sao Paulo 0.339
Taiwan 0.273 Thailand 0.370
Thailand 0.281 Ljubljana 0.545
Luxembourg 0.301 Amsterdam 0.657
Osaka 0.319 Warsaw 0.672
Amsterdam 0.505 Taiwan 0.718
Warsaw 0.668 Amex 0.950
Amex 0.911 Tokyo 0.960
Tokyo 1.022 Luxembourg 1.022
1 The coefficients are residuals from models 2 and 3 in table 5, listed in decending order
so that stock exchanges with the biggest negative coefficients are the most efficient ones.
Note that this analysis omits returns to scale, ie accurate comparisons between exchanges
can be made only for same-size exchanges. The correlation for the residual series is 0.82.
It is also useful to analyse the relative operative efficiency of stock exchanges.
One can provide some preliminary analysis based on the results shown in table 6.
Residuals of the estimated models 2 and 3 provide us with some indicative
information on the efficiency of the individual stock exchanges (see table 8). One
should note that the log of the residuals provides us only with information on the
deviations from the estimated ’average’ cost performance. This information does
not take into account returns to scale, ie it is only possible to compare stock
exchanges that are of the same size. Therefore efficient frontier analysis would be22
a natural topic for future research. In spite of the limitations of the analysis, it
provides the very useful finding that stock exchanges of equal size seem to have
extreme differences in efficiency. This should raise some thoughts (and action) in
the exchanges that find themselvels at bottom of the table. Owners of the AMEX
have actually drawn their conclusions already as evidenced by the AMEX-
NASDAQ merger.
6 Policy discussion and conclusions
6XPPDU\RIWKHVWXG\
My empirical study included 37 stock exchanges from four continents, using data
on operating costs, depreciation and outputs for 1997. I found that there are two
functions performed by stock exchanges. They have computers, software and
personnel for matching and processing trades. This is the trading function. The
second function of stock exchanges is to provide the personnel and regulations
needed to maintain the marketplace and to communicate with companies in order
to handle the listing of companies and to monitor company-specific information
releases.
I estimated the most common linear and nonlinear cost functions in order to
determine whether scale advantages exist in the two outputs of stock exchanges.
The trading system-related output was approximated by number of transactions
and value of transactions. Output related to the listing procedure and to other
activities involving company-specific information was approximated by the
number of listed companies and the capitalisation of companies listed on each
stock exchange.
According to the study, the trading function clearly entails economies of
scale. The function related to the listing procedure and to other activities
involving company-specific information has less returns to scale. However,
returns to scale on the second function are very significant in the biggest stock
exchanges.
There are thus opposing forces, some toward increasing standardization and
scale and others toward the continued existence of more localized facilities. The
outcome may be not be complete amalgamation of exchanges but instead
centralization of certain functions, such as the trading function, and continued
decentralized conduct of other operations.
The overall scale elasticity for stock exchanges is greater than 1.0, which
means that costs would more than double if both number of companies and value
of trading in an exchange were simultaneously doubled. In other words, the area
of economies of scale covers only certain rays. This implies that it is not at all self
evident that the pooling of all activities would save costs. However, analysis show
that returns to scale exist in the combined operations of the biggest exchanges. By
contrast, with the small and medium sized stock exchanges, the poling of
activities does not save costs. In my sample of stock exchanges, the value of
trading is tripled on average when the number of companies is doubled.
My results suggest that the trading function argues for the formation of
alliances whereas the firm-specific information function is supportive of local
knowledge and institutions. The overall result will be a balance between these.23
Apparently, there are no economies of scale for the two functions taken together,
except in respect of big exchanges. Therefore forming alliances that seek to utilize
returns to scale specifically in their trading systems may be a good way to handle
the two functions simultaneously. This analysis, along with some findings on the
US stock market, forms the basis for several policy recommendations on the
establishment of alliances in Europe or elsewhere.
3ROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVDQGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHWUDGLQJV\VWHP
In the light of these empirical findings, it seems clear that European stock
exchangealliances should aim at least toVWDQGDUGL]HWKHWHFKQRORJ\ used in
trading systems. It would probably be optimal toFHQWUDOL]HWKHWUDGLQJV\VWHP
so as to maximize scale economies in the processing of trading. If complete
centralization of the trading system is to be carried out, there will have to be
agreement on the principle for sharing costs and income between stock exchanges.
This agreement should be negotiated so as to better enable the formation of the
one or two Pan-European alliances. The US type of mergers of stock exchanges
may occur also in Europe as the harmonization of legistlation proceeds and the
pressure on existing structures increases.
Economides and Siow (1988) have shown that liquidity considerations will
limit the number of markets in a competetive economy. In their spatial
competition model with liquidity as a positive externality, there may be too few
markets because nobody wants to use a new market with low liquidity. Later,
Economides (1993) showed that networks (such as electronic trading systems) are
by their nature self-reinforcing. As a consequence, networks exhibit positive
critical mass. A second consequence is that optimality will not result from perfect
competition. According to Economides, this opens the possibility that some
market structures (such as monopoly) which can coordinate expectations, might
achieve larger networks and higher welfare than would perfect competition.
A third observation is that network providers have market power through the
setting of standards for the network. Stock exchanges usually set rules and
regulations on their trading systems. This, according to Economides (1993),
impedes technological innovation. The papers by Economides and Siow (1988)
and Economides (1993) provide substantial motivation for authorities and the
investment community to ensure that the coming pan-European alliance or
alliances do not act as a price cartel or use their market power to impede
competition, ie IUHHHQWU\DWUHDVRQDEOHFRVWVVKRXOGEHHQVXUHG in one way or
another to allow for competition with the existing infrastructure and with possible
new enterprises at each point of time.
Economides (1993) also discusses another relevant issue that is of importance
for the interpretation of the analysis provided in this paper and for the policy
discussion. He argues that equilibrium price information from a financial
exchange network is another externality, in addition to the market liquidity
discussed above. As the validity of the market price established in a network X is
an increasing function of the size of the network, it may be better for a small
network Y to use the price information provided by the network X instead of
engaging at all in price discovery itself. As more customers switch to network Y,
the validity of the market price in network X is reduced, according to the
argumentation in Economides (1993).24
This question was analysed empirically by Bessembinder and Kaufman
(1998). They examined execution costs for trades in stocks listed on the NYSE
and trades executed on the NYSE, the NASD dealer market, and the regional
stock exchanges during 1994. NYSE members are allowed under SEC rule 19c-3
to compete with NYSE spesialists by executing trades in NYSE-listed firms in
off-exchange systems. They found that some off NYSE exchanges have
specialized in attracting small trades in the shares of large NYSE-listed
companies. A concern here stems from their observation that exchanges other than
the NYSE are actually cream skimming as some of them concentrate on trades
that take advantage of price discovery in the NYSE. They also found that realized
bid-ask spreads are higher for shares that are subject to cream skimming. Thus the
validity of the NYSE market price seems to be reduced as customers (brokers)
switch to alternative networks. The problem of course is that this is not
necessarily in the interest of end investors, as the spreads are wider and quality of
the market price worse. A solution suggested by Economides (1993) is to price
market equilibrium information appropriately. This question relates to legistlation
and interim rules and regulations as well as microstructure of trading systems of
stock exchanges and specifically those of alliances.
3ROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHOLVWLQJSURFHGXUHDQGRWKHUDFWLYLWLHV
LQYROYLQJFRPSDQ\VSHFLILFLQIRUPDWLRQ
It may be optimal to keep the company-specific-information-related functions
close to the source of original information, ie in the local exchanges. This is the
case because little or no scale advantages were found exept in very big exchanges.
Furthermore, differences in language and culture also reduce the quality of
communication if these activities are centralized. On the other hand, total
harmonization eg of listing rules and other regulations might save a lot money as
no returns to scale were found in these activities, at least in small stock exchanges.
In the light of discussion above, it also makes sense that at least the Frankfurt-
London alliance should seek to withdraw multiple listings so as to maximize
liquidity and minimize multiple listing costs.
&RQFOXVLRQV
This study underlines the need for European stock exchanges to quickly proceed
with cooperative efforts. Formation of alliances might be a good way to start the
consolidation process among European stock exchanges. Alliances are needed,
and they should lead to significant cost reductions. On the other hand, scale
economies do not exist in all operations of exchanges, except perhaps in the very
largest marketplaces. Therefore it may be that it is optimal to search for function-
specific scale advantages by establishing a standard for trading systems or even by
centralizing them. At the same time, it may be optimal to leave the listing process,
as well as other connections with companies, and news releases to the national
stock exchanges.
It was found that scale economies exist only in the very large exchanges but
that there are significant scale economies with respect to the processing of trades.
It is therefore obvious that the coming European alliance(s)/exchange(s) should25
need to be big enough to enable them to compete with the New York Stock
Exchange as regards the listing and trading volume of the leading companies in
the world. Many intercontinental mergers of listed companies have already been
announced.
The empirical findings of this paper were also discussed with respect to some
theorethical and empirical findings of other papers. It was found that legistlation
and interim regulation of stock exchanges, as well as the microstructure of the
trading sytem, are important elements of a liquid and efficient trading
environment. It is also clear from the public policy point of view that it is
necessary to ensure that competition is not diminished by marketplace rules and
regulations.
6XJJHVWLRQVIRUIXUWKHUUHVHDUFK
Data in this study covered only one year. Even though it was very time consuming
to obtain the data used in this study, it would be useful to get time series of data as
well as even better coverage. Efficient frontier analysis would give further insight
into relative efficiencies of individual stock exchanges. Use of alternative pricing
of outputs of exchanges would allow one to analyse the optimal pricing policy of
stock exchanges, and suchanalysis  would certainly increase our understanding of
stock exchanges.26
References
Annual Reports (1997) $QQXDO5HSRUWVRI6WRFN([FKDQJHV
Bauer, P.W. - Hancock, D. (1995) 6FDOH(FRQRPLHVDQG7HFKQRORJLFDO &KDQJH LQ
)HGHUDO5HVHUYH$&+3D\PHQW3URFHVVLQJ Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Economic Review, Vol. 31, No. 3, 14-29.
Baumol, W.J. – Panzar, J.C. – Willing, R.D. (1988) &RQWHVWDEOH 0DUNHWV DQG WKH
7KHRU\ RI ,QGXVWU\ 6WUXFWXUH Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, Orlando,
Florida 32887.
Berger, A.N. – Humphrey, D.B. (1997) (IILFLHQF\ RI )LQDQFLDO ,QVWLWXWLRQV
,QWHUQDWLRQDO6XUYH\DQG'LUHFWLRQVIRU)XWXUH5HVHDUFK European Journal of
Operational Research, 98, 175–212.
Berger, A.N. – Mester, L.J. (1997) ,QVLGHWKH%ODFN%R[:KDW([SODLQV'LIIHUHQFHVLQ
WKH(IILFLHQFLHVRI)LQDQFLDO ,QVWLWXWLRQV" Journal of Banking and Finance, 21,
895–947.
Berndt, E.T. (1991) 7KH 3UDFWLFH RI (FRQRPHWULFV &ODVVLF DQG &RQWHPSRUDU\
Massachusetts Insitute of Technology and the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
Bessembinder, H. - Kaufman, H.M. (1997) $ &URVV([FKDQJH &RPSDULVRQ RI
([HFXWLRQ &RVWV DQG ,QIRUPDWLRQ )ORZ IRU 1<6(OLVWHG 6WRFNV Journal of
Financial Economics, 46, 293-319.
Davis, E.P. (1990) ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO&HQWUHV±$Q,QGXVWULDO$QDO\VLV Bank of
England, No. 51.
Economides, N. (1993) 1HWZRUN(FRQRPLFVZLWK$SSOLFDWLRQWR)LQDQFH Financial
Markets, Institutitions & Instruments, Vol. 2, No. 5.
Economides, N. - Siow, A. (1988) 7KH'LYLVLRQRI0DUNHWVLV/LPLWHGE\WKH([WHQW
RI/LTXLGLW\6SDWLDO&RPSHWLWLRQZLWK([WHUQDWOLWLHV The American Economic
Review, Vol. 78, No. 1, 108-121.
FIBV (1997) $QQXDO5HSRUW International Federation of Stock Exchanges, Paris.
Gaspar, J. – Glaeser, E.L. (1996) ,QIRUPDWLRQ7HFKQRORJ\DQGWKH)XWXUHRI&LWLHV
NBER Working Paper, 5562.
Gehrig. T. (1998a) &LWLHV DQG WKH *HRJUDSK\ RI )LQDQFLDO &HQWHUV University of
Freiburg and CEPR.
Gehrig, T. (1998b) &RPSHWLQJ0DUNHWV European Economic Review, 42, 277–310.
Hart, O. – Moore, J. (1996) 7KH*RYHUQDQFHRI([FKDQJHV0HPEHUV¶&RRSHUDWLYHV
9HUVXV2XWVLGH2ZQHUVKLS Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4.27
Kindleberger, C.P. (1974) 7KH )RUPDWLRQ RI )LQDQFLDO &HQWHUV $ 6WXG\ LQ
&RPSDUDWLYH(FRQRPLF+LVWRU\ Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 36.
Princeton university.
MacKinnon, J.G. - White, H. (1985) 6RPH+HWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\&RQVLVWHQW&RYDULDQFH
0DWUL[ (VWLPDWRUV ZLWK ,PSURYHG )LQLWH 6DPSOH 3URSHUWLHV Journal of
Econometrics 29, 305-325.
Malkamäki, M. – Topi, J. (1999) (XUR&KDOOHQJHV6WRFNDQG'HULYDWLYH([FKDQJHV
DQG 6HFXULWLHV 6HWWOHPHQW Forthcoming in Bank of Finland Discussion Paper
Series.
O’Brien, R. (1992) *OREDO )LQDQFLDO ,QWHJUDWLRQ 7KH (QG RI *HRJUDSK\ Royal
Institute of International Affairs, Chatman House, London.




Value of trading Number of Market value Number of
transactions Of companies companies
USD m 1000 USD m listed
1RUWK$PHULFD
Amex* 143230 5001.5 124606 710
Montreal* 44689 1934.6 422694 557
NASDAQ 4481682 98960.4 1737510 5487
NYSE 5777602 102550.4 8879631 2626
Toronto* 305155 11142.2 567635 1420
Vancouver** 6470 2081.2 6615 1429
6RXWK$PHULFD
Sao Paulo** 190658 1871 255478 537
(XURSH$IULFD
0LGGOH(DVW
Amsterdam** 280901 3798.6 468897 348
Athens 21137 3733.3 33784 210
Brussels** 33867 2300 138938 265
Budapest* 7039 Na 14700 na
Copenhagen 46732 1018.9 93766 249
Estonia 1573 122.4 1139 28
Germany* 1067688 27815.5 825233 2696
Helsinki 36252 568.1 73322 126
Irish 17301 261.3 49371 102
Italy 203280 11051.7 344665 239
Ljubljana 544 131.4 1876 78
London 1989489 9673.4 1996225 2513
Luxembourg 1048 47 33892 284
Madrid 138737 7891.8 290383 388
Oslo 49601 829.8 66503 217
Paris 414321 37000 676311 924
Prague 6260 na 10817 Na
Stockholm 175822 4836 264711 261
Switzerland* 568882 6130 575339 428
Warsaw 7953 3500 12135 143
$VLD3DFLILF
Australian* 171004 6141 295411 1219
Hong Kong* 453657 32601 413323 658
Jakarta** 42605 2972.5 29050 281
Tokyo* 896055 Na 2160585 1865
Kuala Lumbur 145688 21580 93182 703
New Zealand 10725 517.1 29889 190
Osaka 221990 1834 Na 1275
Philippine** 20350 1850 31212 221
Taiwan 1308634 154345 296808 404
Thailand** 24599 8730 22792 431
* Costs include costs from derivative exchange activities
** and securities settlement%$1.2)),1/$1'',6&866,213$3(56
ISSN 0785-3572
1/99 Anne Brunila – Juhana Hukkinen – Mika Tujula  ,QGLFDWRUVRIWKH&\FOLFDOO\
$GMXVWHG%XGJHW%DODQFH7KH%DQNRI)LQODQG¶V([SHULHQFH. 1999. 30 p.
ISBN 951-686-603-4. (KT)
2/99 Olli Castrén $FFRXQWDELOLW\RIWKH(&%DQGD*RYHUQPHQW¶V,QFHQWLYHVWR5HEHO
DJDLQVWWKH&RPPRQ0RQHWDU\3ROLF\LQ(081999. 20 p. ISBN 951-686-604-2.
(RP)
3/99 Atso Andersen – Mikko Niskanen – Sami Yläoutinen (XURRSDQSDQNNLHQ
NHKLW\VQlN\PLl(Future Prospects for European Banks). 1999. 28 p.
ISBN 951-686-605-0. (RM)
4/99 Markku Malkamäki $UHWKHUH(FRQRPLHVRI6FDOHLQ6WRFN([FKDQJH$FWLYLWLHV"
1999. 28 p. ISBN 951-686-608-5. (TU)